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Abstract
The present study seeks to analyze the demand for liquid assets under the
assumption that holdings of money, U.S. Treasuries, and corporate debt secu-
rities directly contribute to investorsutility. Specically, the representative
agents utility function includes a separate argument denoted as "liquidity ser-
vices" which depends on the level of liquid asset holdings. First, this paper
presents results from nonparametric tests of investorsbehavior - namely tests
for utility maximization, and tests for weak separability. I nd that monthly
per capita data on consumption, money balances, and holdings of U.S. Trea-
suries, and corporate debt securities are consistent with utility maximization
and weak separability. The second part of the empirical analysis employs
Generalized Method of Moments to estimate coe¢ cients of Euler equations
which are derived from a variety of specications of the representative agents
modied utility function. Further, to nd the most suitable functional form,
parameter estimates are compared across di¤erent specications and di¤erent
data sets. However, only the most restrictive utility specication yields pa-
rameter estimates which are relatively robust to the choice of data, while in
some cases the estimates di¤er from those known from the literature.
JEL classication: C14, D12, G12
Keywords: nonparametric analysis, revealed preference, as-
set pricing, liquidity premium, euler equation.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies on determinants of corporate-U.S. Treasury bond yield spreads nd
that Investors value the liquidity of U.S. Treasury bonds. At the same time U.S. Treasuries
degree of liquidity, which might be perceived as an inherent feature, or being driven by
changing market conditions, is found to be priced separately from commonly studied spread
determinants which are implied by the standard Asset Pricing Theorys Consumption Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM).3
A recent study by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) (KVJ) nds a signicant
negative association between the aggregate supply of U.S. Treasuries and corporate-U.S.
Treasury bond yield spreads. They argue that this reects a demand function for what they
call U.S. Treasury-specic liquidity services or "convenience yields". Therefore, the high level
of liquidity services o¤ered by Treasuries would drive down their yields compared to assets
that do not to the same extent share this feature. Further, when the supply of Treasuries
is low, the value that investors assign to the liquidity services o¤ered by Treasuries is high,
implying increasing (decreasing) Treasury prices (yields) and in turn, increasing corporate-
Treasury bond yield spreads. The same argument applies in the opposite direction when the
supply of treasuries is high. Moreover, Niestroj (2012) (NIE) nds evidence that the notion
of priced liquidity services is not only U.S. Treasury-specic. In particular, it is shown that
investors value liquidity services which can be provided by a variety of assets - while each
asset might be featuring this attribute to a di¤erent degree. This does not only support the
view that investors in general value the attribute of liquidity services provision when pricing
assets, but also this points to the existence of a demand function for liquidity.
However, both approaches derive asset pricing models under the ad hoc assumption that
asset holdings directly contribute to investorsutility. Specically, liquidity services are de-
rived via an unknown aggregator function which is a separate argument of investorsutility.
Neither approach provides a complete specication of the underlying preference and aggre-
gator functions but denes a set of requirements to them.
This paper seeks to ll this gap by providing a complete specication and parameteriza-
tion of a representative agents utility function which can rationalize the investorsbehavior
observed by KVJ and NIE. For that purpose I rst use nonparametric testing routines to ex-
amine whether a preference maximization model cannot be rejected where liquidity services
directly contribute to investors utility. Specically, I check Varians (1982) necessary and
su¢ cient revealed preference conditions for monthly data on consumption, money holdings,
Treasury holdings and prices, and on corporate debt securities holdings and prices. Consis-
tency of the data with these conditions means non-rejection of the hypothesis that investors
3 see Longsta¤ (2004), Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005),
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Pueger and Viceira (2012).
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are maximizing a utility function which is nonsatiated, continuos, concave and monotonic.4
Further, I test whether the data satisfy necessary and su¢ cient revealed preference conditions
for weak separability between several groupings of the liquidity services providing assets and
consumption. This is done by applying the procedure proposed by Fleissig and Whitney
(2003). The reason for employing this second nonparametric test is that KVJ and NIE im-
plicitly assume weak separability for their analyses. As pointed out by Swo¤ord and Whitney
(1987) weak separability is a convenient feature as it keeps the subsequent theoretical analysis
analytically tractable and for the empirical part of the study, it reduces data requirements and
conserves statistical degrees of freedom. If both hypotheses are not rejected, the question for
a suitable specication of the investors utility function arises. As the nonparametric testing
routines applied in this study do not provide much guidance for that, Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) is employed to estimate coe¢ cients of Euler equations which are derived
from the investorsoptimization problem under several proposed utility specications. This
further poses an indirect test of the asset pricing models employed by KVJ and NIE. This
is due to the fact that only a subset of the proposed utility function specications meets
the requirements which are imposed on investorsdemand behavior by their modied asset
pricing model.
This paper provides evidence from the nonparametric testing routines that necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for utility maximization and weak separability are obtained for the
dataset. However, results from GMM estimations imply rejection of almost all proposed
utility specications. Only the model based on the specication proposed by Poterba and
Rotemberg (1986) is not rejected. Estimation results however, imply parameter values which
indicate misspecication.
Estimating parameters of utility functions which include consumption and an aggrega-
tor function of near monies holdings, which is denoted as "liquidity services", goes back to
Poterba and Rotemberg (1986). The aim of this study was to examine the impact of open
market operations on short-term interest rates. Analyzing the e¤ects of nonstandard mon-
etary policy operations such as large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) has recently
become an active eld of macroeconomic research. These measures have been introduced
to provide liquidity in exchange for private sectorsassets. From a theoretical perspective,
it is generally expected that such nonstandard open market operations in private assets do
not exhibit an e¤ect on real variables. In particular, as shown by Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), this irrelevance result by Wallace (1981) applies to the canonical New Keynesian
macroeconomic model approach. Hence, the model framework for monetary policy analysis
as summarized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007)
4The data used for the present analysis are basically the same as in KVJ and NIE, while it is assumed that
money, Treasuries, and corporate debt securities are providing liquidity services. The reason for the choice of
the data set lies in the intention of this paper to carry forward the analysis of the previous authors.
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does not provide a suitable approach for the evaluation of the e¤ectiveness of this policy.
Contributions like Chen, Curdia, and Ferrero (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2013), Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010), and Del Negro et al. (2013) rely on investorsheterogenous preferences
and on nancial market frictions to make the relative supply of liquid assets have an ef-
fect on the equilibrium allocation. Schabert and Reynard (2009), Schabert and Hörmann
(2011), and Christo¤el and Schabert (2013) assume for this purpose liquidity constraints and
model explicitly the central banks balance sheet policy options. Others like Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Swanson (2011), and Peersman (2011) employ econometric
approaches by using event studies, and in the last case, a VAR analysis.
So far, macroeconomic models that analyze the e¤ects of nonstandard monetary policy
measures do not rely on household preferences which account for assets liquidity services.
In particular, such an approach would be criticized as being ad hoc. The present study
investigates whether there is evidence in favor of such an approach by deriving a rst proposal
for a suitable utility function. This is done by providing a set of microfoundations, starting
with nonparametric hypothesis testing, and then by moving on to parameter estimations.
Varians (1982) Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) provides testable
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a nite number of observations on consumer behavior
to be consistent with the preference maximization model. Varian (1982 and 1983) points out
that the standard approach is to postulate a possible parametric form for demand functions
and tting them to observed data, and then to test for the hypothesis under consideration.
In contrast to that, employing the test for GARP does not require an ad hoc specication of
functional forms and is therefore completely nonparametric. Specically, instead of testing
the joint hypothesis that demand behavior can be described by some parametric form and the
restriction one wants to test for, Varian (1982) provides a complete test of the hypothesis in
question alone. As further pointed out by Varian (1982 and 1983), this test relies on algebraic
conditions on a nite body of data to be consistent with the maximization hypothesis. These
are denoted as "revealed preference" conditions and provide a complete test on the restriction
imposed by maximizing behavior, in the sense that every maximizing consumers demand
behavior must satisfy these conditions, and that all behavior that satises these conditions
can be viewed as maximizing behavior.5
Under the assumption that assets are held for real nonpecuniary returns from such at-
tributes as their perceived liquidity, it is a convenient feature of the utility function under
consideration to be weakly separable in the arguments of consumption and so called liquidity
services which are derived from liquid asset holdings. As pointed out by Swo¤ord and Whit-
5Note that revealed preference analysis was not only at the time of its introduction a major contribution
to the theory of consumer behavior but still is an active eld of research. E.g. see Blundell (2005), Blundell,
Browning, and Crawford (2003), and Andreoni and Miller (2002). The basic idea has been applied in a number
of other areas of economics. A recent application can be found in the eld of agricultural economics on revealed
preferences for organic and cloned milk. See Brooks and Lusk (2010).
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ney (1987), weak separability implies two-staged budgeting. Households rst decide upon
the allocation of expenditures between consumption and asset holdings. In the second stage
Households allocate expenditures among the goods within each subgroup based only on the
relative prices of the goods in that group. Weak separability has the necessary and su¢ cient
condition that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between any two goods within a group
is independent of the goods outside the group. Hence, for the determination of the utilitys
functional form it can be assumed that liquidity services are derived by a yet unknown aggre-
gator function of the liquid asset holdings, which represents a separate argument of the utility
function. To test for weak separability I use the approach by Fleissig and Whitney (2003).
Employing this procedure comes with the advantage that in case of nonrejection of the weak
separability hypothesis one can easily revert to well known functional forms for the aggre-
gator like constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas. If weak separability
does not obtain, two stage budgeting procedure is not an accurate description of consumer
behavior. Moreover, this would pose evidence against the asset pricing models proposed by
KVJ and NIE.
Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987) further point out, that the second stage of the two-staged
budgeting process is the focus of mainly microeconomists examining how households allocate
total consumption expenditure among various categories of goods and services. In particular,
this involves estimating parameters of demand functions and utility functions. Monetary
economists like Barnett (1980), Feldstein and Stock (1996), and Drake and Mills (2005) have
used this approach to obtain estimates of elasticities of substitution between narrow trans-
action balances and less liquid near monies in attempts to clarify the appropriate denition
for money balances. Nonparametric tests to evaluate if groups of monetary assets are weakly
separable from other goods have been used, among others, by Barnett, Fisher, and Serletis
(1992), Belongia (1996), Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987, 1988), and Drake and Chrystal (1994,
1997) while the construction of the monetary aggregates is neglected.
With the revealed preference tests done the question for a suitable specication of the
representative investors objective function arises. The approaches by KVJ and NIE impose
several requirements to its unspecied underlying utility function, whereas the nonparamet-
ric revealed preference tests which are applied in this study provide support for a wide set
of possible utility function specications. To nd the most suitable one, GMM is employed
which is frequently used to estimate and test asset pricing models.6 In this paper I estimate
coe¢ cients of Euler equations which are derived from the investorsoptimization problem
under di¤erent utility specications. In particular, I consider Cobb-Douglas and CES aggre-
gator functions for the liquidity services measure. The aggregator functions are nested in
utility functions with each displaying constant relative risk aversion. As it can be shown,
6For a theoretical treatment of this method see Hansen (1982). For recent empirical studies employing
GMM on asset pricing models see e.g. Stock and Wright (2003), Yogo (2004), and Hall (2005).
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the investorsdemand behavior observed by KVJ and NIE is consistent with the aggregator
function to be CES, and the utilitys arguments of consumption and liquidity services to be
not additively separable. Hence, this empirical analysis of di¤erent utility specications can
be regarded as an additional test of the models by KVJ and NIE.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the nonparametric testing routines
which are applied in the present study and the data. Further, results from hypothesis testing
are presented. Section 3 discusses the representative agents utility maximization problem
and derives Euler equations under alternative specications of the investors utility function.
Results from GMM estimations are presented here as well. Section 4 concludes.
2 Nonparametric tests for utility maximization and weak separability
2.1 Testing the maximization hypothesis
This analysis employs Varians (1982 and 1983) nonparametric approach to demand analysis.
Varian (1982) shows that observed demand behavior can be rationalized by a nonsatiated,
continuous, concave, monotonic utility function if one of several equivalent conditions is met.
The easiest one to test is Varians (1982) GARP.7
To recover investorspreferences from a nite number of observations of k -vectors of prices
and quantities
 
pi; xi

; i = 1; :::; n; with pi =
 
pi1; :::; p
i
k

; and xi =
 
xi1; :::; x
i
k

; consider the
following denitions:
Denition (1): A utility function rationalizes the data
 
pi; xi

,
i = 1; :::; n; if u
 
xi
  u (x) ; for all x such that pixi  pix, for
i  1; :::; n.
Denition (2): An observation xi is directly revealed preferred to a
bundle x, written xiR0x, if pixi  pix. An observation xi is revealed
preferred to a bundle x, written xiRx, if there is some sequence of
bundles
 
xj ; xk; :::; xl

such that xiR0xj ; xjR0xk; :::; xlR0x. Then R
is the transitive closure of the resolution R0.
Denition (3): The data satises the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) if xiRxj implies pjxj  pjxi.
Varian (1982) points out that the third denition demands that there are no cyclical
inconsistencies if xi is preferred to all other a¤ordable bundles. Then xi is better than any
bundle xj chosen at all prices pj : It is further pointed out, that the advantage of GARP is
that it is an easily testable condition, and as Afriats Theorem demonstrates it is a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for utility maximization:
7The remainder of this subsection is taken from Varian (1982 and 1983).
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Afriats Theorem (Afriat 1967, Diewert 1973, Varian 1982)
The following conditions are equivalent:
(1) there exists a nonsatiated utility function that rationalizes the data.
(2) the data satises GARP.
(3) there exist numbers U i; i > 0; i = 1; :::; n that satisfy the Afriat
inequalities: U i  U j + ipi  xi   xj, for i; j = 1; :::n.
(4) there exists a concave, monotonic, continuous, nonsatiated utility
function that rationalizes the data.
Where U i is the utility level and i the measure for marginal utility of income at observed
demands. Varian (1982) points out, that the equivalence of conditions (1) and (4) shows that
if some data can be rationalized by any nondegenerate utility function at all, this utility
function has desirable properties. Or put di¤erently, violations of continuity, concavity, and
monotonicity cannot be detected within a nite number of observations. Further, conditions
(2) and (3) give directly testable conditions that the data must satisfy if it is to be consistent
with the maximization model. Condition (3) asks for a nonnegative solution to a set of linear
inequalities. Condition (2) is more convenient for computation. As pointed out by Varian
(1983), Afriat (1967) derived Afriats Theorem rst with a di¤erent but equivalent version of
condition (2) which demanded that data satises "cyclical consistency" and Diewert (1973)
provided a di¤erent proof, omitting a consideration of condition (2). As further pointed
out, Varian (1982) showed that GARP is equivalent to Afriats (1967) cyclical consistency
condition. GARP is to be preferred as it is much easier to evaluate in practice.8
To test whether GARP is satised Varian (1982) proposes to use the dataset to construct
an n by n matrix M; with the i  j entry is given by
mij =
(
1; if pixi  pixj ; that is xiR0xj
0; otherwise.
)
The matrix M summarizes the relation R0: Hence, once R - the transitive closure of the
directly revealed preference relation R0 - is known one can test whether GARP satised. For
that purpose Varian (1982) proposes Warshalls algorithm which operates onM to create the
matrix MT , where
mtij =
(
1; if xiRxj
0; otherwise.
)
MT represents the relation R: Hence, to test for consistency with GARP one has to look at
each element mtij = 1, and check if pjxj > pjxi, for some i and j. If that is the case then
8For a detailed discussion see Varian (1982).
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there is a violation of GARP detected.
2.2 Testing the weak separability hypothesis
To check whether goods can be either combined or have to be studied independently, a test
for weak separability is performed. Fleissig and Whitney (2003) propose a new method to
evaluate the separability conditions from the revealed preference theory of Varian (1983).9
Following Varian (1983) partition the data in two sets of goods and prices
 
pi; xi

,
 
qi; yi

with i = 1; :::; n.
Denition (4): A utility function u(x) is (weakly) separable in the y
goods if there exists a subutility function (y) and a macro function
u(x; (y)) which is continuous and monotonically strictly increasing
in (y), such that u(x; y)  u(x; (y)):
Varian (1983) points out that the necessary condition for weak separability demands that
the subdata must satisfy GARP because each observation must solve the problem
max (y) (1)
s:t: qiy qiyi: (2)
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for separability are summarized by the following
theorem of Varian (1983):
Varians Separability Theorem (Varian 1983) The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a weakly separable concave, monotonic, continuous
nonsatiated utility function that rationalizes the data.
(ii) There exist numbers U i; V i; i; i > 0; that satisfy separability
inequalities for i; j = 1; :::; n :
U iU j + jpj  xi   xj+ j=jpj  V i   V j ; (a)
V i V j + jpj  yi   yj : (b)
(iii) The data
 
qi; yi

and
 
pi; 1=i; xi; V i

satisfy GARP for some
choice of
 
V i; i

that satises the Afriat inequalities.
Fleissig and Whitney (2003) point out that condition (ii) provides a direct way for testing
the necessary and su¢ cient conditions. However, one would need to check for a solution to
9The remainder of this subsection is taken from Fleissig and Whitney (2003).
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a system of 2n (n  1) equations of which half of them are nonlinear. Fleissig and Whitney
(2003) assert that condition (iii) is equivalent to evaluating GARP with 1=i as a "sub group
price index" and V i as a "sub group quantity index" for the separable goods yi: Varians
(1983) NONPAR algorithm is based on condition (iii), where indices are calculated to satisfy
the inequality constraint (b). If the data pass the test for GARP fullling condition (iii),
then from condition (i), it follows that the observed data are consistent with weakly separable
preferences. Fleissig and Whitney (2003) point out, if NONPAR does not nd that the data
on the y-goods pass the GARP test, weak separability cannot be rejected since there might
be other values for the quantity and price indices that may satisfy the inequalities of (b).10
Hence, Varians (1983) NONPAR approach tests the su¢ cient but not necessary conditions
for weak separability.
Fleissig and Whitney (2003) propose a new approach to evaluate Varians separability
condition (iii) by using an alternative method to estimate V i and i: The aim is to nd
an estimate of an unknown aggregator function (y; q) which is a function of prices and
quantities of the y-goods. This approach relies on Diewert (1976, 1978) who shows that
a certain class of statistical index numbers provides a second-order approximation to an
arbitrary or unknown, twice-di¤erentiable linear homogeneous aggregator function. This
class of index number is denoted as "superlative index". Two of those Indices which posses
the property of being superlative are for example the Fisher Index and the Törnqvist-Theil
Index. Therefore, Fleissig and Whitney (2003) build on calculating superlative index numbers
to obtain estimates for V i and a corresponding range of i that satisfy Varians conditions.
The rst step of the procedure proposed by Fleissig and Whitney (2003) uses a superlative
index number QV i = f (q; y) ; which is a function of prices and quantities from the y-goods
as an initial estimate for V i in the inequality (b). The objective is to nd how close the
superlative index QV i is to providing a solution. By adding a positive number QV ip or a
negative number QV in to QV
i the superlative index number with error
QV i = QV i +QV ip  QV in;
will provide a solution if one exists. If QV ip = 0; and QV
i
n = 0; for i = 1; :::; n; the superlative
index without error provides a solution. Under the assumption that the superlative index
number with error gives a solution to the separability inequalities, (b) can be written as
QV i +QV ip  QV in  QV j +QV jp  QV jn + jpj
 
yi   yj : (3)
In the next step the deviations around the superlative index QV i are minimized by making
QV ip and QV
i
n as small as possible. If there exists a superlative index number with error QV
i
10Fleissig and Whitney (2003) state that Barnett and Choi (1989) nd that for this reason Varian (1983)
fails to nd weak separability even for data generated by Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
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and corresponding i > 0, that satisfy (3) then QV i can be regarded as the "group quantity
index" and 1=i as the "group price index" for the separable goods y. These are used by
Fleissig and Whitney (2003) to solve the separability conditions (iii) of Varian (1983). As a
vector QV i might give a large range of values for i that satisfy the separability conditions,
the budget constraint from the separable y-data is used to nd values for i without restricting
the solution. Taking the group quantity index QV i and group price index 1=i, it is required
that
 
1=i

QV i = incy;i;
where incy;i is the expenditure on the y-goods in period i. See equations (1) and (2). Solving
for i gives
i = QV i=incy;i: (4)
Hence, the aim is to keep i the inverse of the group price index as close as possible to
QV i=incy;i and thus to minimize deviations from adding up
i = QV i=incy;i + ip   in;
where ip are positive deviations and 
i
n are negative deviations around QV
i=incy;i. When
QV ip , QV
i
n, 
i
p, 
i
n are close to 0, then the superlative index (with some error) provides
a solution to the Afriat inequalities with adding up (closely approximated). Fleissig and
Whitney (2003) note that to nd a solution to the problem, Varians (1983) separability
theorem requires the inverse of the group price index to be nonnegative. Additionally the
group quantity indices with and without errors are required to be nonnegative to retain an
economic interpretation of the solution.
Fleissig and Whitney (2003) use linear programming to nd a solution to the problem
described above. Under the constraints (3) and (4) as well as the respective nonnegativity
constraints the objective is to minimize the deviations of QV i for the calculated superlative
index QV i and to minimize the deviations of
 
1=i

QV i from the expenditures on the y-
separable goods. These equations can be represented in the form of a linear program (LP)
model
min

c0x Ax  b; x  0	 ;
where A is the coe¢ cients matrix, c is the objective vector and b is the right-hand side
vector. Note that this approach requires conversion of nonnegativity constraints to weak
inequalities. The LP model by Fleissig and Whitney (2003) nds a solution to the Afriat
inequalities, if it exists, by minimizing the deviations around QV i and QV i=incy;i:11
11See Fleissig and Whitney (2003), pp. 135 - 136, 141.
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2.3 Data description
Aggregate time series data on four categories of goods are used for the present study. These
categories cover data on consumption, money balances, corporate debt securities, and Trea-
sury debt securities. The latter two are divided into two subclasses, namely short-term
securities and long-term securities. In this study I use 474 monthly per capita observations
from January 1969 to June 2008. The goods and assets which are subject to the testing
procedures are labeled as:12
CnDUR: real average personal consumption of nondurables.
M: money balances, currency component of M1 plus demand deposits.
TrBi: holdings of Treasury bills.
TrBo: holdings of Treasury bonds.
CP: holdings of commercial paper, P1 rated.
CB: holdings of private sector issued bonds, Aaa rated.
The data series are deated using a 2005 price index and are calculated as per capita values
by dividing through total population. As pointed out by Swo¤ord and Whitney (1987), the
way per capita asset holdings are calculated here, might be subject to some criticism. The
"household sector" in this study includes asset holdings by institutional investors, personal
trusts and nonprot organizations. These organizations probably hold little cash and a small
amount of demand deposits but holdings of corporate debt securities and Treasuries are
substantial. Further, deriving per capita data by dividing through total population may also
cause problems. Of course consumption is done by individuals under the age of eighteen
acting on their own behalf. However, here the six year old is treated as an independent
agent.
Securitiesprices are derived from returns on Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, commercial
paper, and corporate bonds. These are treated as holding period returns of zero coupon
discount bonds. Returns on equity are derived from Standard and PoorsS&P 500 Index.
2.4 Nonparametric tests: results
First, the tests to check for the utility maximization hypothesis are performed. The data are
not consistent with utility maximization if they violate GARP. The approach I pursue in this
study, is to rst check which grouping of goods can be rationalized by a well behaved utility
function and then to test the feasible groupings for weak separability. I apply the proposed
test for violations of GARP by Varian (1982) on the following groupings of goods:
12See Appendix A for data and variables description.
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A. CnDUR;M; TrBi; CP ,
B. CnDUR;M; TrBo;CB,
C. CnDUR;M; TrBi; TrBo.
To keep the present study close to the framework of KVJ and NIE in each grouping only
three liquid assets are included. Set A includes Treasury bills and commercial paper which
have a rather short maturity length compared to the Treasury bonds and corporate bonds
grouped in B. Analyzing set A separately from set B reects the assumption that investors
have a di¤erent valuation of short-term and long-term liquidity services. Set C captures the
notion that an assets-in-the-utility specication might be suitable to explain a connection
between changes in the slope of the yield curve and household demand behavior.
Results from testing A, B, and C for consistency with GARP are presented in Table
1. For grouping A, 97.5 percent of the data, for B, 96.7 percent of the data, and for C,
96.3 percent of the data satisfy GARP. As violations of GARP make up a very low share
among the 474 observations, I regard the testing results for all groupings as not rejecting the
utility maximization hypothesis for the data sample.13 Hence, per capita data on nondurable
consumption and money balances, combined with U.S. Treasury holdings and corporate debt
security holdings can be regarded as rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. Violations
of GARP among data on asset prices and asset holdings might be found in times when
unforeseen price movements are strong enough to make the holding of a once preferable
portfolio to suddenly contradict the utility maximization principle.14
With the maximization hypothesis being not rejected for sets A, B, and C, next is to
test for weak separability using the procedure by Fleissig and Whitney (2003). Under the
assumption that Treasury bills, Treasury bonds, commercial paper and corporate bonds yield
nonpecuniary returns to the investor, such as liquidity services, I test the hypotheses whether
the following sets of money and asset holdings can be regarded as an argument of investors
utility which is weakly separable from consumption:
Ut=U [CnDUR;V (M;TrBi; CP )] ; (5)
Ut=U [CnDUR;V (M;TrBo;CB)] ; (6)
Ut=U [CnDUR;V (M;TrBi; TrBo)] : (7)
Results are presented in Table 2. For the case of assumed 1 percent measurement error,
among all of the groupings (5), (6), and (7) no violations of weak separability conditions are
13Varian (1991) proposes a statistical test for the size and number of violations of GARP. However, due to
the very low share of violations in this study I refrain from further investigation.
14During the Great Moderation there might have been few situations where nancial markets saw such
strong price movements. However, events like the Oil crisis, the Volcker disination, or Black Monday 1987
might have had an e¤ect on securities prices which was forceful enough.
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found. For the case of 5 percent measurement error only for the most liquid grouping (5),
no violations of the separability conditions are detected. Testing (6) at 5 percent measure-
ment error nds violations of separability conditions for 28 percent of the observations, and
for testing (7) at 5 percent measurement error the share of violations makes up 16 percent.
However, I neglect the results for assumed 5 percent measurement errors as I regard U.S.
data as being measured accurately enough for the purposes of the present study. Hence, for
the purpose of the further empirical analysis I regard necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
weakly separable utility maximization as being obtained for nondurables consumption and
money balances, along with liquidity services associated with Treasury bills and commer-
cial paper holdings, Treasury bonds and corporate bonds holdings, and Treasury bills and
Treasury bonds holdings. Further, note that the procedure by Fleissig and Whitney (2003)
evaluates separability conditions by using a superlative index to aggregate quantities of sep-
arable goods. For the necessary and su¢ cient separability conditions being met, this implies
that the underlying unknown aggregator function can be regarded as linearly homogeneous
and twice-di¤erentiable. Hence, for the second part of the empirical analysis it can be as-
sumed that CES or Cobb-Douglas aggregator functions might be suitable candidates for the
separate argument within the utility function which captures liquidity services.
Table 1: Violations of the utility maximization hypothesis
Goods category (1) (2) (3)
CnDUR X X X
M X X X
TrBi X X
TrBo X X
CP X
CB X
Share of violations 0.025 0.033 0.037
Share consistent with GARP 0.975 0.967 0.963
Notes: This table presents results for testing sets A, B, and C for consistency with GARP.
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Table 2: Test for weak separability
Goods category (1) (2) (3)
CnDUR X X X
M X X X
TrBi X X
TrBo X X
CP X
CB X
Measurement error 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
Share of violations 0 0 0 0.28 0 0.16
Share consistent with GARP/Sep 1 1 1 0.72 1 0.84
Notes: This table presents results for the Fleissig and Whitney (2003) test for weak separability.
3 Determination of the utilitys parametric representation
With nonrejection of the hypotheses of utility maximization and weak separability, this study
now turns to estimating preference parameters for a set of proposed utility functions. Non-
parametric testing routines and evidence from KVJ and NIE support a liquidity services-
in-the-utility formulation for empirical work on householdsasset demand. For the further
proceeds of the analysis utility functions are assumed which include as arguments both, con-
sumption, and liquidity services while the latter capture non-pecuniary returns to the investor
by holdings of a certain group of assets. Liquidity services are derived by an aggregator func-
tion which has holdings of money, Treasuries and corporate debt securities as arguments. It
is required that those assets are not perfect substitutes in terms of utility. Otherwise there
would be no need for an aggregator function - a simple sum aggregate would su¢ ce.
3.1 Modied asset pricing model
Following KVJ and NIE assume that under the premise that investors value liquidity services
a representative agents utility function which shall fulll the Inada conditions is of the form:
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ut = u (ct;  (mt; bt; st)) ; (8)
where ct is the agents consumption at date t and  () denotes the measure for liquidity ser-
vices which is an (unknown) aggregator function of the real holdings of money mt, Treasuries
bt; and corporate debt securities st: The liquidity services function  () is assumed to capture
unique services provided by liquid assets which are valued by investors, where 
0
() > 0; and

00
() < 0. The liquidity services function is concave as it is assumed that  () is increasing
in mt, bt and st, but the marginal benet derived from liquidity services is decreasing in mt,
bt and st. Further, it has the property of limmt;bt;st!1 
0
() = 0: This reects the assumption
that holding more liquidity services providing assets reduces the marginal value of an extra
unit of such an assets. Further, this marginal value approaches zero if the agent is holding a
su¢ ciently large amount of liquidity services providing assets. Moreover, under the assump-
tion that investors value liquidity, holding one more unit of an asset that is the most liquid
should c.p. generate more utility than holding one more unit of the least liquid i.e.
@ ()
@mt
>
@ ()
@bt
>
@ ()
@st
:
From the rst order conditions of the households utility maximization problem moment
conditions for the GMM estimation are derived. These will be used in section 3.3 to estimate
parameters of the implied demand functions. The representative household is further assumed
to maximize the expected sum of a discounted stream of utilities
E0
1X
t=0
tu

ct; 

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

; (9)
subject to the budget constraint
Ptct +Mt +
Bt
Rbt
+
St
Rst
+
Dt
Rdt
 Ptyt +Mt 1 +Bt 1 + St 1 +Dt 1; (10)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information set in the initial period
and  2 (0; 1) ; is the subjective discount factor. The price of one unit of consumption at date
t is denoted by Pt. The household gains a real endowed income yt and carries wealth into the
next period by investing in nominal holdings of moneyMt, Treasuries Bt, and corporate debt
securities St. Nominal equity holdings Dt provide the numeraire asset in dening preferences.
Further, the agent is assumed to hold only zero coupon discount bonds which pay out one unit
of currency when being held to maturity. The gross returns on money, Treasuries, corporate
debt securities, and equity are Rmt = 1, R
b
t , R
s
t , and R
d
t . Maximizing the objective (9) subject
to the budget constraint (10) leads for given initial values and non-negativity constraints to
the following rst order conditions for real consumption and real holdings of money, equity,
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Treasuries, and corporate debt securities:
@u
@ct
= t; (11)
@u
@mt
+ Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

= t; (12)
Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=
t
Rdt
; (13)
@u
@bt
+ Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=
t
Rbt
; (14)
@u
@st
+ Et

Ptt+1
Pt+1

=
t
Rst
; (15)
and (10) holding with equality and the accordant transversality conditions.15 Dene the
stochastic discount factor for nominal payo¤s as Mt+1 = 
@u=@ct+1
@u=@ct
Pt
Pt+1
, so that from (12),
(14), and (15) the optimality conditions for holdings of money, Treasuries, and corporate
debt securities can be derived which can be interpreted as pricing equations:
@u
@mt
=
@u
@ct
+ Et [Mt+1] = 1; (16)
@u
@bt
=
@u
@ct
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rbt
; (17)
@u
@st
=
@u
@ct
+ Et [Mt+1] =
1
Rst
: (18)
The rst term on the left hand sides of equations (16), (17), and (18) captures the modication
of the standard asset pricing model by the assumption of liquidity services.16 The marginal
utility from holding money mt, Treasuries bt; and corporate bonds st induces a liquidity
services premium on each assets price. Increasing the investorsholdings of mt, bt; and st
should decrease liquid assetsprices which is due to the assumption of  () being concave.
Hence, equations (16) - (18) reect that under the assumption of liquidity services being an
argument of the investors utility function, increasing the amount of liquid assets held will
lower the investors willingness to pay for another unit of such assets.
Note that the assumed functional form of the aggregator  () is crucial. KVJ and NIE
do not fully specify the functional form of  () but implicitly dene a set of requirements to
it. It can be shown that employing a CES aggregator nested in a CRRA utility would match
those requirements.17 Specically, in this case each assets liquidity services premium is not
only driven by the level of holdings of the respective asset, but in addition to that, it is driven
by the total holdings of liquidity services providing assets. Moreover, by assuming @()@mt >
15The transversality conditions for holdings of Treasuries, corporate debt securities, and equity are given by:
limj!1 jEt
 
t+jbt+j=R
b
t+j

= 0; limj!1 jEt
 
t+jst+j=R
s
t+j

= 0; and limj!1 jEt
 
t+jdt+j=R
d
t+j

=
0.
16Please note that for simplicity default risk is neglected.
17See Appendix B.
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@()
@bt
> @()@st ; increasing the holdings of mt should c.p. decrease asset prices to a larger extent
than increasing the holdings of bt and st. Analogously, the same applies c.p. for increasing
the holdings of bt compared to increasing holdings of st: This requirement can be fullled by
making use of the CES aggregator. In contrast to that, employing a Cobb-Douglas aggregator
nested in a CRRA utility implies that each assets liquidity services premium is driven by
the level of holdings of the respective asset but not by the total holdings of liquidity services
providing assets. E.g. the liquidity premium on Rst would be a function of st; and not of mt
and bt. This implication however, is not in line with KVJ and NIE. Further, assuming additive
separability between the utility functions arguments of consumption and liquidity services,
as well yields implications which are not in line with the investorsbehavior observed by KVJ
and NIE. Specically, for the case of a CES aggregator together with additive separability,
each assets liquidity services premium would not be a decreasing function in total holdings of
liquid asset. For the Cobb-Douglas aggregator, the liquidity premium would be decreasing in
holdings of the asset under consideration but increasing in overall asset holdings. Note that
the CES function degenerates to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator if the elasticity of substitution
is unity. One could estimate the model under a parameter restriction on the elasticity of
substitution. However, the present papers approach is to rst estimate a broad variety of
possible model specications and then to select the most suitable one.
3.2 Moment conditions
Set (13) equal to (12), (14), and (15). Then plug in (11) for the shadow price of income
t  0, then
1=Et
"
@u
@ct
  Pt
 
1 + rdt

Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
#
; (19)
0=Et

@u
@mt
   Ptr
d
t
Pt+1
@u
@ct+1

; (20)
0=Et
"
@u
@bt
  Pt
 
rdt   rbt

Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
#
; (21)
0=Et
"
@u
@st
  Pt
 
rdt   rst

Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
#
; (22)
which yields Euler equations and implied demand functions for consumption (19) money (20),
Treasuries (21), and corporate debt securities (22). Here I already used the representation
of the equations as conditional moment conditions. Equations (19) - (22) are now written in
terms of excess returns. Note that rdt , r
b
t , and r
s
t denote net returns on equity, Treasuries,
and corporate debt securities. The Euler equation for consumption has the well known
interpretation like in the standard case without assets in the utility. The Euler equation
for money holdings (20) requires that in equilibrium utility cannot be increased by holding
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one unit of money less at time t, investing it in equities, and consuming the payo¤ at time
t + 1. The forgone utility associated with a one unit reduction in money holdings is @u@mt
1
Pt
:
Transferring one unit of money to equities at time t increases real wealth at t+1 by rdt ; since
money yields no nominal return while equity does. The gain in utility if these higher proceeds
are consumed in period t+1 is Et
h
rdt
Pt+1
@u
@ct+1
i
: Equating this to foregone utility yields (20).
Analogously Euler equations (21) and (22) equate the costs and benets in terms of utility
of transferring one unit of currency from Treasuries or corporate debt securities into equities
for one period.
3.3 GMM estimation models
Methodologically, this paper follows previous authors like Holman (1998). For each pro-
posed specication of utility function (8) correspondent sets of Euler equations are derived
from (19) to (22) which are then estimated by using GMM. The Euler equations state that
in equilibrium the representative agents expectations are orthogonal to all of the variables
within the information set at the time predictions are made. Specically, they imply popu-
lation orthogonality conditions which are a function of the observed data and the preference
parameters. The GMM estimator is a nonlinear instrumental variable estimator of the pop-
ulation parameters that tries to make the sample orthogonality conditions close to zero by
minimizing a distance function.18 According to Verbeek (2000) there are several advantages
of this method when estimating asset pricing models. One is that GMM does not require
distributional assumptions or assumptions regarding data generating processes. Further it
can allow for heteroskedasticity of unknown form which is a convenient feature when working
with data on asset returns. Importantly it can estimate parameters even if the model cannot
be solved analytically from the rst order conditions. This is especially useful for the present
asset pricing models which are comprised of the nonlinear Euler equations (19) to (22).
I use the same time series data on consumption and holdings of money, Treasuries and
corporate debt securities, as well as the same data on prices and returns as in Section 2.3 of
this paper. Further, three di¤erent sets of instruments are employed, depending on whether
Treasury bills and commercial paper holdings, Treasury bills and Treasury bond holdings, or
Treasury bond and corporate bond holdings, are arguments of (8). Following the approach
of Hall (2005) each set of instruments includes a constant term, two lagged values of the real
returns on equity, and the real returns on the correspondent assets included in each of the
estimation models, as well as the past two growth rates of real per capita consumption and
real per capita asset holdings. The reason for this choice is that lagged values and lagged
growth rates can be assumed to be uncorrelated with current innovations.
Note that there are more instruments than parameters. Hence, the system of Euler
18Hansen (1982) provides the conditions under which the GMM estimator is consistent, asymptotically
normal, and e¢ cient.
18
equations is overidentied. The J -test of overidentifying restrictions by Hansen (1982) and
Hansen and Singleton (1982) is used to conduct a joint test of the specication of the asset
pricing model and the validity of the instrument set.
The following six specications of investors utility are proposed:
I. Poterba Rotemberg Utility: Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) use a nested CES pref-
erences specication:
u

ct; 

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt

=
1

(
ct Lt

Mt
Pt
;
Bt
Pt
;
St
Pt
1 )
;
where Lt captures liquidity services derived from a CES aggregator function:
Lt =

M

Mt
Pt

+ B

Bt
Pt

+ (1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
:
This utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. Further, utility is Cobb-Douglas
in consumption and liquidity services, ensuring that more consumption raises the marginal
utility of liquidity services and vice versa. The liquidity measure is a CES function of real
money balances, Treasuries holdings and corporate debt securities holdings. It must be
pointed out that these preferences are quite restrictive. In particular, they impose homo-
geneity and require separability between its arguments. Further, the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and liquidity services is assumed to be equal to one.
With these preferences, from equations (19) to (22) the following moment conditions can
be derived:
1=Et
"
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 
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(1 ) 1
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1  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
Pt+1
c 1t+1 L
(1 )
t
#
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"
ct L
(1 ) 1
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
St
Pt
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 1
  
1  
Pt
 
rdt   rst

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 1t+1 L
(1 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:
I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.4: For a rst round of esti-
mations I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that M ; B; and (1  M   B)
be positive and sum up to one. Further, I require ; ; and  to be positive between zero and
one, and  to be less than zero. The validity of the model and the restrictions are checked
by using the J-test of overidentifying restrictions. The constraints are successively relaxed if
the J-test rejects the model together with the restrictions in place. If  was equal to one,
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convenience yields and liquidity services can not be regarded as a source of utility. Note that
if  was estimated to be exactly zero, Lt would degenerate to a Cobb-Douglas aggregation.
If the elasticity of substitution  is close to one, linear aggregation would be implied. In
the latter case money, Treasuries, and corporate debt securities would be close substitutes in
terms of utility.
II. Nested CES Liquidity Services: In contrast to Poterba and Rotemberg (1986), in
this case utility is not Cobb-Douglas in consumption and liquidity services:
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived by the CES aggregator function
Lt =

M

Mt
Pt
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+ B

Bt
Pt

+ (1  M   B)

St
Pt
 1
:
This utility function as well exhibits constant relative risk aversion. These preferences are less
restrictive compared to Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) as a unitary elasticity of substitution
between consumption and liquid assets is not demanded. Following (19) to (22) moment
conditions are then given by
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:
I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.4. For the estimation
I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that M , B; and (1  M   B) be
positive and sum up to one. Further, I require  and  to be positive and between zero and
one, and  to be less than zero.
III. Nested CES Liquidity Services, additively separable: Utility is not Cobb-
Douglas in consumption and liquidity services but assumed to be additively separable in
its arguments:
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;
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived by the CES aggregator function
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:
Here equations (19) to (22) become
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:
I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; M ; Bg in section 3.4. For the estimation
I constrain the utility function parameters. I require that M ; B; and (1  M   B) be
positive and sum up to one. Further, I require  and  to be positive between zero and one,
and  to be less than zero.
IV. Cobb-Douglas Utility with Cobb-Douglas liquidity services: Utility is assumed
to be Cobb-Douglas in consumption and liquidity services.
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where Lt denotes liquidity services which are as well derived by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator
function
Lt =

Mt
Pt
M Bt
Pt
B St
Pt
(1 M B)
:
Again these preferences are quite restrictive. The utility function exhibits constant relative
risk aversion. It imposes homogeneity and separability. Further, a unitary elasticity of
substitution between consumption and liquidity services is assumed.
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From (19) to (22) moment conditions are then given by
1=Et
"

Pt
 
1 + rdt

Pt+1

ct+1
ct
 1Lt+1
Lt
(1 )#
;
0=Et
24ct M MtPt M(1 ) 1 BtPt B(1 ) StPt(1 M B)(1 )
  1  Ptr
d
t
Pt+1
c 1t+1 L
(1 )
t
35 ;
0=Et
24ct MtPt M(1 ) B BtPt B(1 ) 1 StPt(1 M B)(1 )
  1 
Pt(rdt rbt)
Pt+1
c 1t+1 L
(1 )
t
35 ;
0=Et
264ct MtPt M(1 ) BtPt B(1 ) (1  M   B)StPt
(1 M B)
(1 ) 1
  1 
Pt(rdt rst )
Pt+1
c 1t+1 L
(1 )
t
375 :
I report estimates of the parameters f; ; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.4. For the estimation I
constrain the utility function parameters. I require M ; B; and (1  M   B) to be positive
and sum up to one, and  and  to be positive between zero and one, and  to be less than
zero.
V. Nested Cobb-Douglas Liquidity Services: Utility is not Cobb-Douglas in consump-
tion and liquidity services
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived from a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function
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Then equations (19) to (22) imply
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I report estimates of the parameters f; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.4: For the estimation I con-
strain the utility function parameters. I require that M , B, and (1  M   B) be positive
22
and sum up to one. Further, I require  to be positive between zero and one, and  to be
less than zero.
VI. Nested Cobb-Douglas Liquidity Services, additively separable: Utility is ad-
ditively separable in consumption and liquidity services:
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where Lt captures liquidity services derived from a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function
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:
This utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion. Equations (19) to (22) imply
the following moment conditions
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I report estimates of the parameters f; ; M ; Bg in Section 3.4. For the estimation I
constrain the utility function parameters. I require that M , B, and (1  M   B) be
positive and sum up to one. Further, I require  to be positive between zero and one, and 
to be less than zero.
3.4 GMM estimation results
In the following subsections of this paper GMM estimation results are discussed for the
moment condition sets I to VI. For each Table presenting estimation results, in the rst column
estimates are shown for the dataset including nondurables consumption, money balances, and
data on returns and holdings of Treasury bills and commercial paper. Columns 2 and 3 present
results for the sets including data on Treasury bills and Treasury bonds, and on Treasury
bonds and corporate bonds.
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I. Poterba Rotemberg Utility: Table 3 presents the estimates of the parameters from
specication I. with corresponding moment conditions. Three sets of estimates correspond-
ing to each dataset are reported. For all of the three data sets the J-test of overidentifying
restrictions indicates rejection of model I. at the 5 percent level with all constraints on , ,
, , M , and B in place. The model is rejected as well at the 5 percent level for relaxing
the restriction on  and subsequently relaxing the restriction on : The model is not rejected
at the 5 percent signicance level if the restrictions on , M , B; and (1  M   B) are
in place for all data sets. The estimated coe¢ cient values are remarkably similar across the
three model estimations. Further, in the fourth column I report results from Poterba and
Rotemberg (1986).19 Note that in this case liquidity services are derived from a di¤erent
set of assets. For their estimation the authors use quarterly data from 1959:Q1 to 1981:Q3
on nondurables consumption, money, time deposits, and Treasury bills. Still, it is notable
that estimation results of the present study for the utility specication I. are close to the
results of Poterba and Rotemberg (1986). This is found in spite of employing di¤erent data
sets, di¤erent instrument sets, and a di¤erent data frequency. For the present model the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution  is expected to be larger than zero in absolute terms.
If  = 0; then the nested function degenerates to a logarithmic function of consumption
and liquidity services. Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) estimate a range of  between  6:5
and  5:6, whereas the present study nds a range between  7:7 and  6:0: Across all three
datasets the estimated discount rate  is greater than zero and below one. However, unity
is not excluded from the 95 percent condence intervals in columns 1 and 2. Still the point
estimates are slightly smaller than those which are found in other studies.20 The estimated
share of expenditures devoted to consumption  is for all estimations signicantly greater
than zero at the 1 percent level and lies between 0:68 and 1:07: For the estimations presented
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, results for  suggest that liquidity services are not a direct
source of utility. Only for the estimation model including data on Treasury bonds and cor-
porate bonds, the size of  implies that convenience yield is a source of utility. However,
the size of the point estimate suggests that an implausibly large share of households expen-
ditures is devoted to Treasury bond and corporate bond holdings. The main backdraw of
the present study is that the nonparametric testing procedures provide little guidance about
the functional form of the households utility and about the complete set of liquidity services
providing assets. Hence, the three data groupings considered for this study might leave out
19Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) further provide estimation results for tax adjusted data and di¤erent sets
of instruments. In Table 3 results are taken from an estimation which is closest to the setting which is analyzed
in this paper.
20Hansen and Singleton (1983) estimate that  lies between 0:995 and 1:096: Poterba and Rotemberg (1986)
nd that for their utility specication the discount factor is larger than unity.
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further assets which yield liquidity services.21 The inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between liquidity services yielding assets  is signicantly larger than zero and lies between
0:5 and 0:58: If  was estimated to be 1 a linear aggregator function would be implied. Assets
would be one for one substitutes in terms of utility. If  was equal to zero, the aggregator
would reduce to the Cobb-Douglas specication. The hypothesis that  = 1 is rejected for
all three estimations. Within the convenience yield aggregator the coe¢ cients M , B, and
(1  M   B) are estimated with relatively wide condence intervals. Further, for the esti-
mation model presented in the second column of Table 3, B is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero at the 5 percent level. However, for all three estimations the following pattern of point
estimates is observed: M > B > (1  M   B) : Assuming that real asset holdings were
of equal size, this result implies that marginal utility of another unit of real money balances
would exceed that from another unit of Treasuries or corporate debt securities.
II. Nested CES Liquidity services The estimates of the parameters from specication
II are shown in Table 4. Notably the J-test only does not reject the validity of the model
which is estimated for data on Treasury bills and Treasury bonds. For this estimation result
presented here, only the restrictions on , M , B; and (1  M   B) are in place. Note that
the estimated share of expenditures devoted to consumption  is larger that unity implying
that liquidity services are not a direct source of utility. The estimation model including data
on Treasury bills and commercial paper as well as the estimation model including data on
Treasury bonds and corporate bonds are rejected. Further, point estimates for the three
datasets are not as similar among each other as for utility specication I. The most striking
di¤erence is that estimates for  range between  3:19 and  11:83 and estimates for  range
between 0:09 and 1:00; implying perfect substitutability of liquid assets for the latter case.
Specication II. compared to specication I. does not require the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and the liquid assetsaggregate to be unity. As this requirement seems
to be quite restrictive and there is no theoretical guidance about the size of the elasticity of
substitution for this model, one would not a priori expect that estimating model II yields
J-tests of overidentifying restrictions which indicate rejection of two of the three estimation
models.
III. - VI. Specications The GMM estimation routine does not nd a solution for the
minimization problem. This is found for all of the three di¤erent data sets with the corre-
sponding instrument sets.
21Note that for the present study three datasets were employed which are intended to closely match the
datasets used in KVJ and NIE.
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4 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of aggregate demand for consumption, money balances, U.S.
Treasuries, and corporate debt securities where the asset holdings directly contribute to the
investorsutility. The rst part of the analysis applies Varians (1982) nonparametric testing
procedure on monthly per capita data on nondurable consumption, money balances, U.S.
Treasuries, and corporate debt securities. As violations of GARP can only be detected for a
very low share of the observations, results for the nonparametric testing routines can be seen
as not rejecting the utility maximization hypothesis. Therefore, all of the three groupings can
be regarded as being rationalized by a well-behaved utility function. Additionally, necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for weakly separable utility maximization are obtained for monthly
per capita data on nondurables consumption and money balances, along with liquidity services
derived from Treasury holdings and corporate debt securities holdings. In the second part
of the analysis Euler equations implied by the modied asset-pricing model are estimated
under alternative utility specications. Surprisingly, only the restrictive utility specication
proposed by Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) yields parameter estimates which are relatively
robust to the choice of data. Estimation results however, imply parameter values which
indicate misspecication.
In the presence of many assets which might provide liquidity services, a more complete
modelling of the nancial sector is needed. The paper makes a step in that direction. How-
ever, the analysis su¤ers from several shortcomings. These are primarily limitations of the
particular functional form and parameterization of the utility function and the data choice.
Eventually, the approach should be extended to incorporate a broader range of assets. How-
ever, the nonparametric testing routines provide little guidance about the true functional
form and the true set of liquidity services providing assets. A second issue is that the menu
of important assets changes over time as Poterba and Rotemberg (1986) noted before. E.g.
nancial innovations like the increasing importance of money market mutual funds allow
assets to be repackaged to yield di¤erent degree of liquidity services.
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A Data sources
CnDUR: This variable is constructed as the monthly real per capita consumption expen-
ditures on nondurable goods. Monthly data on aggregate expenditures on nondurable con-
sumption goods are from the Federal Reserves FRED database (series PCEND). Monthly
real values are obtained by a using a deator calculated from a chain-type price index for
personal consumption expenditures (FRED series PCEPI) with 2005 = 100. Further, per
capita data are derived by dividing through monthly total population (FRED series POP).
M: Measures monthly real per capita money balances. This is proxied by the data series
on the currency component of M1 measure plus demand deposits from the FRED database
(series CURRDD). As for CnDUR, real per capita balances are derived by using the same
price index deator and by dividing through total U.S. population.
TrBi: This variable is intended to proxy for the real per capita holdings of Treasury
bills (4-week to 52-week maturity). Here, data on the face value of outstanding marketable
U.S. Treasury bills is taken from Datastream (series name: U.S. Federal Debt - Marketable
Securities Treasury Bills Curn, Id: USSECTRBA). Note that these data do not contain non-
marketable Treasuries i.e. as held in a TreasuryDirect account. Unfortunately I do not have
data on the distribution of maturities among non-marketables. So I can not quantify the
shares of bills, notes, and bonds. Therefore, data on the face value of non-marketable bills
is left out. The time series is as well transformed to real per capita values in the same way
as CnDUR. Prices are calculated from the 3-Month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate
(FRED series TB3MS) which is assumed to be a holding period return of a zero coupon
bill. Further, from the raw data returns are calculated on monthly basis and deated by the
gross growth rate of the price index PCEPI. Quantities held are then derived by dividing
correspondent real per-capita values by the implied prices. This is done for all groups of
assets (See TrBo, CP, and CB).
TrBo: This variable is intended to proxy for the real per capita holdings of Treasury bonds
(20 to 30 years maturity). Data is taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream (series name:
U.S. Federal Debt - Marketable Securities Treasury Bonds Curn, Id: USSECTRDA). The time
series is transformed to real per capita values in the same way as CnDUR. Prices and monthly
net returns are calculated in the same way as for the variable TrBi. Correspondent data is
taken from the yields on Long-Term U.S. Government Securities (FRED series LTGOVTBD
for the period 1969 - 2000 and series GS20 from 2000 - 2008).
CP: Proxies the per capita holdings of commercial paper. Here data on the face value
of outstanding commercial paper issued by nonfarm and nonnancial corporate business is
taken from FRED (series CPLBSNNCB). As before the time series is converted to real per
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capita values. Prices monthly net returns are derived from commercial paper yields in the
same way as for the variable TrBi. Prior to 1971 I use the commercial paper yields series for
prime commercial paper, 4-6 month maturity, from Banking and Monetary Statistics (Table
12.5 for 1941-1970). For 1971-1996 it is the 3-Month Commercial Paper Rate from FRED
(series CP3M) and for 1997-2008 the 3-Month AA Nonnancial Commercial Paper Rate from
FRED (series CPN3M).
CB: Proxies the per capita holdings of corporate bonds. Here data on the face value of
outstanding corporate bonds issued by nonfarm and nonnancial corporate business is taken
from FRED (series CBLBSNNCB). As before the time series is converted to real per capita
values. Prices monthly net returns for corporate bonds are calculated in the same way as for
the variable TrBi. Data are taken from Moodys Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield Index
(FRED series AAA).
Further, for the GMM estimation model monthly returns on the numeraire asset rdt are
proxied by returns calculated on the S&P 500 Stock Price Index (FRED series SP500).
Further returns are deated by the gross growth rate of the price index PCEPI.
B Pricing equations
i. Assume that the aggregator function  () is CES, and is further nested in a CRRA utility
function (this is similar to Poterba and Rotemberg (1986)):
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where  < 0, 0 <  < 1; and 0 < M ; B < 1. Then from equations (16) - (18) it follows that
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:
For the case of a nested CES aggregator each liquidity services premium on the assets prices
is not only determined by the level of holdings of the respective asset but also determined
by the total holdings of liquidity services providing assets, aggregated by Lt. Hence, prices
decrease with additional asset holdings as well as in Lt.
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ii. Now assume that the aggregator function  () is Cobb-Douglas, which is nested in a
CRRA utility function:
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with  < 0, and M ; B; (1  M   B) summing up to 1: Then from equations (16) - (18)
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For the case of the nested Cobb-Douglas aggregator each assets liquidity services premium
is driven by the current level of holdings of the respective asset but not by the total holdings
of liquid assets. This implication is not in line with KVJ and NIE.
iii. Next assume again that the utility function is CRRA with a nested CES aggregator.
However, utility is in this case additively separable in its arguments:
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where  < 0, 0 <  < 1; and 0 < M ; B < 1. Then from equations (16) - (18)
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:
As for a CES function it is assumed that 0 <  < 1; it implies for this model specication
that increasing the holdings of one of the three assets under consideration increases asset
prices. This implication is not in line with the assumptions by KVJ and NIE.
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iv. Assume that the utility function is CRRA with a nested Cobb-Douglas aggregator and
that it is additively separable in its arguments:
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with  < 0, and M ; B; (1  M   B) summing up to 1. Then from equations (16) - (18)
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:
As 0 < M < 1; and 0 < B < 1; the premium on each assets price decreases with the level
of the respective assets holdings. However, the premium on each assets price increases with
additional holdings of each of the respective other two assets. This implication is not in line
with KVJ and NIE.
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